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Post-traditional Corporate Governance
Abstract
Traditional definitions of corporate governance are narrow, focusing on legal relations
between managers and shareholders. More recent definitions extend the boundaries of
governance to consider the role that various stakeholders play in shaping the behaviour
of firms. While stakeholding theory embraces a broader set of corporate constituencies,
our argument in this paper is that even these definitions are too narrow – they lack the
analytical capacity to account for the social embeddedness and legitimacy of corporate
governance. More specifically, we argue that the spatial contexts of corporate
governance are socially constitutive of their governance forms and effects. Different
forms of corporate governance emerge in, and co-produce, variable operating contexts,
as well as shape the roles and interests of their constituent actors. We distinguish
between vertical and horizontal forms of governance in political and economic life,
and outline several consequences for businesses of a shift to post-traditional corporate
governance.
1. The Rise of Corporate Governance
The modern corporation came into existence in the mid-nineteenth century when
British legislation on joint stock incorporation and limited liability granted companies
autonomous legal personhood. The notion of ‘corporate governance’ however is a
more recent phenomenon, which is growing rapidly. The term first appeared in 1981 in
George Siedel's article ‘Corporate governance under the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act’ (Siedel, 1981). In the following ten years, only a further 16 articles appeared on
the subject. By 2002 there was a monumental rise in interest in the topic with 1085
articles written on the subject; the number of articles has doubled in the last four
years1. There is a clear coincidence in recent academic interest in corporate governance
with the rise of laissez-faire policies and the rolling back of business regulation in
many countries. Deregulation has substantially reduced the risks to any individual
involved in the setting up a corporation, but at the same time it has created a
corresponding anxiety about the new and public risks that potentially result from the
decline in national controls, and the risks associated with the spread of non-territorial
capital. While the separation of ownership and control has always involved concerns
about the concentration of power, and therefore its potential abuse, such concerns have
taken on an added urgency in the face of conglomeration and the consequent
substantive increases in the strength and scope of control that managers now possess,
separated from their owners by ever increasing distances. But power differentials
within companies are not the only cause of concern. The way has been paved for a
proliferation of cross-territorial economic transactions where regulatory instruments
that had been developed on the basis of a ‘national economy’ have become
increasingly ineffective.
Possibly the most notable aspect of the OECD’s definition of corporate governance is
its widespread popularity. First appearing in 1999 (and then revised in 2004) it
describes corporate governance as:
1 Numbers from the authors count of the literature in the International Bibliography of the Social
Sciences.
a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its
shareholders and other stakeholders [that] provides the structure through which
the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives
and monitoring performance are determined (OECD, 2004:13)
Many major international and national policy bodies (e.g. the World Bank, the
European Commission, the UK Department of Trade and Industry) have adopted this
definition. What appears at first glance to be a normatively neutral definition is, on
further reading, one laced with directives as to the appropriate set of business
relationships and goals. The goal of corporate governance is “economic efficiency”,
the key corporate governance problems are those that “result from the separation of
ownership and control,” stakeholders are those “established by law” (investors,
employees, creditors, and suppliers), and the role of such stakeholders in corporate
governance is recognised on the basis of their wealth-creating capacities. The
European Commission recommends the OECD definition as “comprehensive”
(Commission of the European Communities, 2003:10) and also emphasises the key
governance problem as that arising from the potentially diverging interests of
managers and equity holders. Finally, the UK government describes the corporate
governance relationship in similar narrow terms, as that “between the constituent parts
of a company – the directors, the boards and the shareholders” (Department of Trade
and Industry, 2007).
These statements on corporate governance by leading policy-making bodies are
directly reflected in the dominant academic school of thought on corporate governance
– ‘agency theory’ – which, for all its variations and nuances, ultimately sees corporate
governance as “a method to ensure that investors get themselves a return” (Mallin,
2004: 5). Alternative definitions extend the boundaries of corporate governance to
include the role that various stakeholders can play in shaping the behaviour of firms.
However, while stakeholder theory embraces a broader set of corporate constituencies,
these actors are still integrated into corporate governance arrangements on the basis of
firms’ contractual (employees, creditors, suppliers) or non-contractual obligations
(affected communities, government, interest groups); and remain secondary to
shareholder interests (Post et al., 2002; Friedman and Miles, 2006).
In sum, the standard (one might even say, hegemonic) notion of corporate governance
is one that takes the goal of corporate governance as the maximisation of shareholder
value. The key actors are those of manager and shareholder, and the central problem is
the principal-agent one; that is, the problem of how to ensure that the agent (manager)
does in fact carry out the duties it is charged with, that of protecting the interests of the
principal (shareholder). The great bulk of management and business articles have
devoted themselves to discussing the various techniques that can best ensure that the
agent’s power is not abused and remains directed towards legitimate ends, the pursuit
of which involves taking account of its broader legal obligations.
From a legal perspective, such a definition is scarcely objectionable. Though legal case
history is replete with moments of ambiguity about the precise responsibilities of a
corporate director, in general the courts have upheld the view that the overriding duty
of managers is to maximise returns to shareholders. After Enron, legal revisions in the
US and a series of legal committees in the UK have supported both the paramountcy of
shareholder authority in corporate governance relations and the conventional goals of
corporation governance legislation. Indeed, the UK Hempel and Turnbull Committees
on Corporate Governance left no doubt that company directors are not accountable to
other stakeholders. The OECD definition and the host of institutions and policy bodies
that have adopted that definition are therefore providing corporations with a clear legal
statement of what it is they are meant to be doing.
However, the legalistic concept formulated by the OECD is not an adequate one for
social-scientific research, which aims not merely to describe, but also to explain the
rise of corporate governance. Its definition does not provide for the fact that it is not
law that determines solely what a corporation can or cannot do, nor law that has the
power to determine the goals of corporations, or indeed to decide which actors are to
be involved in the governance of corporations and the extent of their involvement. The
shortcomings of this traditional concept of corporate governance can most readily be
seen in the actual empirical activities of corporate directors. While the law assures
managers that they need only have regard for the interests of their shareholders, reality
demands otherwise. In his recent scholarly survey on corporate governance, Clarke
notes that “managers are grappling with the need to satisfy the interests of many
complex constituencies than shareholder theory would suggest” (2004:14). Indeed,
such a necessity to address broader social needs was long ago recognised by Durkheim
in his famous discussion of contracts where he showed that although the formation of a
contract directly concerns only the parties involved, nonetheless, if a contract is to
have binding force, it is society which confers that force through norms, values, and
customs (Durkheim, 1918). In today’s parlance, that force, with respect to the
operation of corporations, is known as a ‘social licence’.
2. Corporate Governance and CSR – Parallel Worlds
Precisely why an adequate analytical concept of corporate governance has failed to
develop in recognition of both the contractual and the social forces that govern
corporations is a topic worthy of investigation but one we cannot cover here. What we
do want to suggest is that the lack of a more sociological concept of corporate
governance has most readily been demonstrated by the emergence of the concept of
corporate social responsibility (CSR), and indeed by the creation and growth of
corporate citizenship studies as a separate disciplinary field. 2 CSR discourse advances
a concept of business responsibility at odds with traditional notions of corporate
governance. Where the latter affirms that corporate legitimacy be judged on the basis
of the capacities of a company to increase equity value – a capacity that is secured by
the appropriate distribution of rights and responsibilities between shareholder, board,
and director – the concept of CSR sets out a broader notion of goals and of the means
to attain them. Both views, narrow and broad, are recognised by the companies
themselves. Thus, in their statement of General Business Principles, Shell declare that
“We commit to contribute to sustainable development. This requires balancing short-
and long-term interests, and integrating economic, environmental and social
considerations into business decision-making” (Royal Dutch Shell, 2005: 4). Similarly,
GlaxoSmithKline’s CEO and Chairman write in their introduction to their company’s
report that “while the interests of shareholders remain paramount we also need to
2 One of the reasons lies undoubtedly with the dominance of the subject area by management studies (on
the relegation of corporate citizenship to a management issue, see Glazebrook, 2005).
respond to stakeholder expectations by helping to address society’s healthcare
challenges. We accept this challenge” (GlaxoSmithKline: 2005). And Paul Myners,
Marks and Spencer’s Chairman, writes in the 2006 report that “we believe that being a
responsible business is the right thing to do but we also believe that it makes good
business sense” (2006: 3) Finally, despite the Hempel/Turnbull judgement that
directors are not accountable to stakeholders, British American Tobacco states “We are
working for wider accountability to society, and engaging in constructive dialogue
with stakeholders on the issues surrounding our products….Today, perhaps more than
ever, society expects businesses to use their economic strength for broader social
goals” (British American Tobacco, 2006).
In sum, the governance of the modern corporation is driven by a legal requirement
demanding that corporate powers are distributed between the set of company’s
contractual actors (as laid out in the concept of corporate governance), and a social
requirement that dictates that the power of corporations is greatly dependent on the
legitimacy conferred by a much broader set of social forces (as laid out in the notion of
CSR). Both concepts have developed apace, but they have done so largely divorced
from one another, with corporate governance reports and corporate responsibility
reports published separately by different departments within the same corporation.
3. Towards Integration? Post-traditional Corporate Governance
Whatever the reasons for the emergence of CSR and the extent to which its emergence
and proliferation can be attributed to the inadequacies of the corporate governance
concept, there are, we suggest, consequences to keeping the two discourses apart. We
claim that there are three major drawbacks arising from this separation.
First, modern corporations exhibit what we describe as a role neurosis. Two seemingly
irreconcilable sets of responsibilities face the contemporary manager – at one moment
compelled to present herself/himself as a governor, at the next as a citizen. Yet keeping
such demands separate, both conceptually and in practice, contributes to the fact that
the potential conflict in such a set of responsibilities is never recognized. Instead, the
recognition of broad social goals is recommended as compatible with that of narrow
shareholder interest. For example, the UK Government simply states that “The
Government sees CSR as good for society and good for business”
(http://www.csr.gov.uk/businesscasecsr.shtml). And the European Commission’s
Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry blithely maintain that CSR “is about
integrating social and environmental concerns into business strategy and operations”
(Department of Trade and Industry, 2007). Nowhere, in the business or policy
discourse is much credence given to the obstacles that such a project might entail.
Second, the insistence that social goals can unproblematically be addressed without
reform of the current governance framework makes it difficult to assess what can be
integrated and what cannot. What does integration actually mean here? And why is it
presumed to preclude the possibility of trade-offs and disagreements? More precisely,
the invitation to integrate with, rather than interrogate, business strategy belies the
subordination of CSR to the current drivers of corporate governance. Above all, the
sovereign authority of shareholders means that new norms of non-financial corporate
responsibility are adopted (or not) on their terms – that is, they must be compatible
with the maximisation of shareholder value: other things being equal, the integration of
CSR concerns into corporate governance can be expected only when shareholders’
take a long-term, ‘enlightened’ view of their self-interest.
Third, the separation of corporate governance from CSR contributes to the diffuse
utopianism often characterising the latter, seeking meaning detached from the
everyday demands and practicalities of business. One aspect of this is the uncritical
appropriation by many CSR advocates of other discourses of social responsibility; for
example that of citizenship. If the corporation is, as some commentators argue, ‘a
citizen’, who then are the co-citizens? Are they just other companies? Are they actors
with contractual relations to the corporation (e.g. employees, creditors, suppliers).
What of constituencies significantly impacted by corporate behaviour (e.g. affected
communities) but with no contractual links with the businesses in question? Are they,
then, sub-citizens with weaker claims on corporations? There is clearly a problem in
adopting citizenship roles too quickly, particularly when they threaten to dilute the
clear rights, privileges and obligations that are conventionally ascribed to citizens as
equal members of political communities (Glazebrook, 2005; Thompson, 2005).
It is for these reasons that we urge the development of a concept of post-traditional
corporate governance. The integration of notions of social responsibility into the ways
that companies are governed cannot possibly be met while two competing models
insist on different goals. In contrast to the traditional model of corporate governance, a
post-traditional concept of corporate governance needs to recognise that rule-making is
bound by both the law and the social force of moral and ethical persuasion. And it
cannot assume by fiat which actors are involved in governing the corporation and how
they do so. Such actors change depending on political circumstance, and these contexts
of operation are constitutive of their power. In other words, we need to break with the
tradition of addressing corporate governance in isolation from wider patterns and
processes of societal governance.
4. The New Spaces of Post-traditional Corporate Governance
Early social scientific scholarship on governance dwelt on new forms of decision-
making taking place within domestic political systems. The innovation in governing
was taken to be the inclusion of non-state actors, who engaged with the state in a
variety of (sub)national roles, many of which distanced them from hierarchical centres
of governmental power (Rhodes, 1996; van Kersbergen and van Waarden, 2004).
More recently, governance has served as a description of new modes of private and/or
public authority extending beyond the nation-state, qualified as ‘global’ or
‘transnational’. As at the national scale, we observe the systematic involvement of
non-state actors but in the absence of a world government, the reliance on ‘non-
hierarchical’ structures of rule-making and implementation is even more pronounced
(Risse, 2006). Uncomfortable with the division of governance space according to the
national/global binary, some writers argue that the new geographies of governance are
more accurately represented as multi-scalar or reticular (Bulkeley, 2005).
Governance is thus implicated in the articulation and constitution of new scales or
spaces of governance. In the literature, the key geographical distinction in the mapping
of governance forms is whether they are taking place according to a (i) territorial or
(ii) functional differentiation of space. As we now outline, this has a pivotal bearing on
how the norms and practices of corporate responsibility are delimited.
(i) Territorial differentiation of space
The voluminous literature on globalisation has both informed, and been influenced by,
observations on the rescaling of governance mechanisms. A recurrent theme is the
extent to which territorial forms of state control are ‘denationalised’ or diluted by new
global relations of public and private authority. Neoliberal conceptions of globalisation
point to an unambiguous displacement of national authority by global market forces
(Ohmae, 1995; Friedman, 2005). In this ‘hyperglobalist’ scenario, governance is self-
evidently market-led – the global standardisation and management of capitalist rules of
trade and investment. The territorial scaling here is centrifugal, such that there is, it is
claimed, a vertical or upwards shift in governing authority to international or
supranational institutions invested with pooled sovereignty. This is more than a spatial
realignment of public authority; national policy structures and mechanisms are
transformed and disciplined by global economic demands. Not surprisingly,
corporations – particularly transnational corporations – are perceived as drivers of the
‘marketisation’ of governance at the global scale. Good corporate governance in
hyperglobalist discourse refers to the non-binding standards of transparency, which are
often generalised within and/or between economic sectors as global norms of business
responsibility. The scope for CSR rests on its compatibility with this market liberal
(contractual) model of accountability in which only shareholders are legally
empowered to scrutinise corporate decision-making.
Not all commentators on globalisation concede that new governance arrangements are
associated with the simple erosion of state authority. In the first place, there is a claim
for the continuing primacy of national governance structures and mechanisms: even
transnational companies and global markets still depend on state authorities to protect
commercial freedoms. And the fact that international trade and financial arrangements
extend the role of international law actually reinforces, it is contended, the sovereign
legal authority of nation states (Hirst and Thompson, 1999). Second, there is the
recognition that global economic and social dynamics are reconstituting assemblages
of territory and authority, but that this has multiple scalar implications for governance.
Against the cultural readings of globalisation that impute a sweeping
‘deterritorialisation’ (Appadurai, 1996) or ‘supraterritorialisation’ (Scholte, 2000), we
observe a more sophisticated positioning of governance systems. Thus, Brenner (2004)
identifies an ongoing dialectic of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, prompted
by global capitalist restructuring, in which state institutions are upwards, downwards
and outwards to create new spaces for the deployment of governance authority.
Wettstein (2005) and Sassen (2006) are more open still to context-specific
instantiations of governance which follow complex development paths, blending – and
transforming – global and national logics; for example, currency and human rights
regimes. In these conceptualisations, corporations – as private agents – operate in new
institutional zones that retain some embedding in national contexts or regulatory
control (both home country and host country).
(ii) Functional differentiation of space
Various commentators have argued that new governance structures and mechanisms
actually represent a break from hierarchical (vertical) forms of authority; instead that
are shaped by network (horizontal) modes of coordination (Kooiman, 1993; Leitner,
2004). More generally, the characterisation of the global economy as organised around
transnational networks of capital, management and information is at the heart of
attempts to posit the emergence of a new network society (Castells, 1996). However,
most conceptualisations of network governance do not embrace such a far-reaching
social morphology: they identify, more modestly, particular institutional settings
featuring private organisations or mixes of private and public ones. Governance
networks are typically informal, deemed to rely above all on non-hierarchical or
voluntary forms of steering. As their interaction space is reticular (network-based)
rather than territorial, their rule-setting and implementation mirrors the contours of a
particular problem or function rather than the pre-existing boundaries of national and
international authority (Voss et al, 2006).
Corporations initiate and/or engage in a variety of such networks, differentiated by
function and actor involvement. Those addressing CSR goals include environmental
stewardship schemes, industry-wide benchmarking of social and ecological standards,
and multi-stakeholder partnerships. A high-profile exemplar of this governance mode,
discussed below, is the United Nations (UN) Global Compact – a forum for
international corporate responsibility explicitly informed by a ‘learning network’
rationale: transnational corporations work directly with the UN, in partnership with
civil society groups in identifying and promoting ‘good corporate practices’ (Ruggie,
2002; Kell, 2003).
5. Identifying the actors in post-traditional corporate governance
Much of the enthusiasm and interest in CSR rests on these governance systems
bringing into corporate decision-making process a host of new actors. The problem
with many of these discussions on corporate responsibility is that they concentrate on
the type of actor involved (civil society or government) rather than the actors’ function
(function tends to be read off from type). We contend however that it is not ‘who’ is
involved in corporate governance but rather ‘what’ is involved that is the central
question. It is the powers of actors, how those powers are institutionalised, and how
they vary that is central to the question of the meaningfulness of any particular
governance configuration. In some corporate governance arrangements, government
actors are firmly the key regulators, in others they are facilitators, while in others they
are advocates. Furthermore our interest in such actorhood needs to recognise that
governance actors exist in synergistic relationships, where the powers of one actor will
of course be constituted and affected by the powers of another. Precisely what those
powers are will be affected to a great degree by the shape and location of governance
forms.
From a methodological point of view another tendency in discussions about
stakeholder involvement in corporate governance is the tendency of some CSR
practitioners/professionals to give the answer ‘everybody’ to the question of who to
include in decision-making. Many of those promoting good corporate governance
argue that anyone who impacts on, or potentially impacts upon, the corporation, is a
governance stakeholder. Indeed, commonplace is the argument that sets out the
business case for CSR by highlighting the reputational gains that arise from companies
maximising instances of civic interaction – the more stakeholders the better, the more
diverse the better (e.g. Fombrun et al., 2000). While such an inclusionary approach to
governance may be laudable, from an analytic viewpoint it is somewhat unhelpful in
locating the differential interests of all those making claims for access to corporate
governance. In this discussion we take corporate governance actors to mean those
actors with an institutionalised role in, and/or significant influence on corporate
decision-making.
To illustrate our argument on the constitution of post-traditional corporate governance
within wider governance networks, we give two brief examples – the UN Global
Compact and the European Commission’s civil society dialogue on trade.
(i) Global Governance: the UN Global Compact
As already mentioned, the UN Global Compact has been represented as a paradigmatic
case of network governance. It has eschewed formal rule-making on corporate
sustainability, instead eliciting commitments from companies to adhere to existing
universal statements on core human rights, labour standards, and principles of
sustainable development. As a loosely structured ‘social learning network’, the Global
Compact promotes a horizontal model of dialogue in which the Global Compact Office
publicises and facilitates communication and co-ordination between participating
companies and civil society actors. These information exchanges take place through a
web-based learning forum, multi-stakeholder dialogues and regional Global Compact
networks. In practice, the Compact is overwhelmingly composed of business
organisations, who are the key partners. Civil society stakeholders have complained
both of their marginalisation within the Global Compact and that the Global Compact
Office itself has been deficient in its monitoring of the behaviour of participating
companies. It is significant that this questioning of the integrity (and accountability) of
the initiative has led to the Global Compact Office taking more seriously it oversight
responsibilities, while strengthening the advisory role of environment and development
NGO participants as distinct from participating business associations. In other words,
there has been a realignment of the governance roles of participating actors in order to
boost the legitimacy of the initiative.
(ii) The European Commission and the Civil Society Dialogue on Trade
The ‘civil society dialogue’ sponsored by the European Commission is a clear example
of a governance network where the participants roles are, to an extent, demarcated and
institutionalised. It is also an example that exemplifies the merits of conceiving of
network participants not purely in terms of role or sector status (business, civil, or
government), but in terms of the variance in functions and powers that attach to each
role position. Such functions and powers are constituted in a relational sense where
alterations in one role will often see a corresponding adaptation or alteration in another
role. Civil society, for example, may enter a network in a mere observational capacity
but over time become constituted as an advisor, auditor, or interlocuter. It is these
changes and the corresponding shifts in power that need to be the focus of attention in
examinations of governance networks.
The European Commission is the executive wing of the European Union and holds
responsibility for initiating and implementing legislations. It is a governance body par
excellence - its powers conferred through the cooperation of national governments (the
European Union) but with no direct accountability to a national or supranational
(European) electorate. Its perceived democratic deficit has triggered pressure on the
Commission for greater transparency and accountability to citizens and civil society at
the national and European level, including pressure from business associations
unhappy with increasing regulatory demands.
The ‘Civil Society Dialogue’ in Directorate General (DG) Trade was established in
1998 and was one of the earliest attempts to establish by the Commission to establish a
structured dialogue with civil society. The dialogue brought together business and
civic associations in a conscious effort to practice the Commission’s policy of good
governance and to give voice to all stakeholders. Prior to 1998 informal consultations
between DG Trade, experts, and outside bodies took place, but it was not until the
launch of the Civil Society Dialogue that an institutionalised place at the table was
created for business and civic associations. Even then, however, dialogue initially
proceeded on an ad hoc basis, with DG Trade organising the meetings and taking
responsibility for the setting of the agenda. The collapse of trade negotiations at Seattle
and the media coverage of NGO concerns was a major impetus to the Commission to
structure more thoroughly a role for civic and business associations as joint members
of a European civil society. Dialogue after 1999 became more regular, more
institutionalised. Where DG Trade had initially monopolised the role of ‘organiser’, a
combination of business and civic associations came to forward the ‘contact group’
which took over the task of setting the agenda for discussions. This has a significant
impact on Commission deliberations on governance: indeed, the Commission’s White
Paper on governance (COM (2001) 428 final) endorsed their recommendations for
greater consultation with civic and business associations in EU decision-making.
These examples of governance networks (Global Compact and Civil Society Dialogue)
illustrate different trajectories for business engagement with non-national governance
networks, where the collective representation of corporate interests was, in one case,
constituted as separate from civil society (Global Compact) and, in the other, part of
civil society (Civil Society Dialogue). Both examples also highlight the autonomous,
significant role of business associations in attempting to influence the rules of the
game under which corporations operate. Transnational civil society forums connected
to international or supranational organisations have acquired increasing weight in the
global business environment, with power to confer or withdrawal social legitimacy on
private economic actors. Precluded by their for-profit status from participating directly
in civil society dialogue, corporations must look to their business associations to
project their corporate governance/CSR interests within these arenas. In the Global
Compact case, high-profile CSR commitments by participating corporations were
rendered vulnerable by the initial lack of effective engagement by non-business civil
society associations in its internal decision-making. In the case of DG Trade, business
associations joined environment and development NGOs as ‘social partners’ in
assuming increasing control of a civil society dialogue on trade that influenced wider
European Commission policy proposals on European governance. To be sure, these
same business associations were also active in other Commission consultative arenas –
e.g. the European Corporate Governance Forum – where their push for regulatory
relief created more tension with environmental advocacy groups; so the strategic
positioning of business associations vis-à-vis civil society is context-dependent.
5. The Renewal of a Social Licence? The Effects on Businesses of Post-traditional
Corporate Governance
The new forms of governance outlined above have significant consequences for the
behaviour and control of corporations. Depending on the governance mechanism and
purpose, the enthusiasm of businesses will vary: the declared preference of most large
corporations for non-mandatory regimes of CSR monitoring and review reflects the
voluntarist self-understanding of good governance prevalent within the private sector.
Yet there is extensive evidence of new procedural opportunities for stakeholders in
corporate governance, even if the legal entitlements are indirect (via social and
environmental regulation) rather than embedded in company law. It is much more
difficult to gauge the substantive changes in corporate performance (financial and non-
financial) that may have arisen as a result of new forms of public and private
governance. Aside from the analytical problem here of the absence of systematic
empirical information and the presence of numerous intervening variables, there are
unavoidable normative implications bound up with the evaluation of governance
effects. It is useful nevertheless to set out discrete classes of governance effects that are
associated with distinctive aspects of post-traditional corporate conduct and behaviour
– (i) transparency, (ii) stakeholder participation, (iii) organisational learning and (iv)
accountability.
(i) Transparency
Good corporate governance on CSR issues has become associated above all with
managerial transparency and, insofar as firms are embracing the corporate citizenship
agenda, an openness to the concerns of community stakeholders and environmentalists.
The rapid growth of sustainability reporting is an important indicator of the diffusion
within the global business world of norms of social and ecological responsibility
(Association of Chartered Certified Accountants, 2004; Owen, 2006). In November
2006, www.corporateregister.com, the most comprehensive online directory of
corporate non-financial reports, listed 12709 reports from 3467 companies across 88
countries. By itself, of course, this reveals nothing of the reasons corporations adopt
such norms; but, in the wake of several high-profile corporate corruption cases, the
growing uptake of voluntary sustainability reporting resonates with wider moves by
state and non-state actors to strengthen public scrutiny of the financial and non-
financial conduct of businesses.
(ii) Stakeholder participation
Arguably, the greatest potential challenge posed by CSR proponents to existing
structures of corporate governance – one that rests on the outcome of shifting political
coalitions and interests – is the legal empowerment of stakeholder interests, notably
social and ecological communities significantly affected by corporate decisions. There
are few signs of this at the level of national governments, where shareholders have
been the targeted beneficiaries of more onerous legal rules on financial reporting and
corporate transparency (e.g. 2002 Sarbanes Oxley Act in the US). To be sure, some
commentators have identified international moves legally to recognise stakeholder
rights. For example, Thompson (2005) notes such a provision in the Principles of
Corporate Governance prepared by the OECD (1999), which he claims anticipates a
transition from CSR to corporate citizenship, where stakeholders are legally
represented in business boardrooms. Yet there is little prospect of a breakdown or even
significant dilution in the tight legal control exerted on company directors by
shareholders.
(iii) Organisational learning
While commentators have remarked on the lack of theoretical precision and clarity in
the literature on organisational learning – e.g. Wang and Ahmed (2003) – there is a
general recognition that the transfer of knowledge and skills within and between
companies may be enhanced by increased corporate transparency. However, the
inward-looking, functionalist slant of much organisational learning literature has
tended to miss the knowledge gains for corporations that may be available from
increased communication with civic actors. Even in instrumental terms, there are
obvious cognitive benefits (e.g. joint problem-solving, managing external risk
exposure) to businesses from consulting stakeholders. Furthermore, recent
anthropological perspectives on organisational learning are pinpointing more precisely
the relationship between governance activity and knowledge transfer within and
between corporations (Amin and Cohendet, 2000; 2004; Black, 2006).
For example, Wal-Mart’s ‘sustainable value networks’ have recently been lauded as
intra-company learning with their institutionalisation of collaborative groups
comprising executives, suppliers, environmental NGOs and public regulators (Gunther
2006). And Thompson (2005) observes that the ‘internationalisation of voluntary
standards’ of corporate social and environmental reporting, represents the leading edge
of inter-company learning. Prominent examples here include Corporate the Global
Reporting Initiative, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development and,
again, the Global Compact (with its explicit ‘social learning network’ model as
described by Ruggie, 2002).
(iv) Accountability
Accountability effects (intended or unintended) are inevitable consequences of the
growing tendency of corporations to adopt comprehensive systems for non-financial
(social and environmental) responsibility? By accountability we mean, following
(Bovens, 2006: p. 9): ‘a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor
has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose
questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences’. Corporate
governance initiatives oriented to CSR remain locked within the ‘soft’ accountability
framework of market liberalism where, outside contractual relationships, answerability
to affected social and ecological communities is solely at the discretion of the
company. Perceived deficiencies with this model of responsibility have animated civil
society actors to employ novel forms of governance control to put pressure on
corporations for greater public answerability and redress – for example, civil
regulation and the creative use of common law tort claims (Mason, 2005; Vogel,
2006). The scope of such accountability demands is unlikely to diminish as long as the
negative social and environmental impacts of corporations are widely perceived by
civil society actors as unchecked by state authorities.
Indeed, the growth of a global human rights discourse on corporate social and
environmental performance is accentuating the demands for stronger (legal) modalities
of corporate accountability within and across national borders. Proposals include calls
to enshrine minimum standards of corporate public accountability for corporate
behaviour in an international treaty framework – e.g. procedural rights of affected
communities to consultation and judicial review over corporate decisions (Dine, 2000:
pp. 176-82) and the obligation on corporations to respect core human rights (United
Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 2003;
Wettstein, 2005).
6. Conclusion
It is now accepted by many leading companies that ‘good corporate governance’
encompasses an inclusive, stakeholder-based approach. At least for UK and other
European companies, this implies sensitivity to an operating environment in which
CSR, human rights and environmental standards are routinely acknowledged, both in
terms of social, ethical and environmental (SEE) risk assessments and wider notions of
appropriate corporate conduct (Ruggie, 2006; Schepers, 2006). Under this perspective,
affected local communities join suppliers/contractors, employees and government
regulators as legitimate stakeholders, but without any formal legal recognition. There
is still a need for further comparative research to locate the motivations for this
realignment of corporate governance; but it is clear that it would not exist were it not
for the widespread belief amongst leading companies that ‘good governance’ is
compatible with, and even a driver of, a long-term maximisation of shareholder value.
In this paper we have argued that even this ‘enlightened stakeholder’ approach
misconstrues the social embeddedness of corporate governance. That embeddedness is
manifest in the spatial contexts of corporate governance, which have real governance
effects. Different forms of corporate governance emerge in, and co-produce, variable
operating contexts, as well as shape the roles and interests of their constituent actors.
We distinguished between vertical forms of governance where firms are governed by
various (post)territorial articulations of state authority, and horizontal forms of
governance where firms establish networks to govern their behaviour that are mainly
voluntarist in nature. Whatever the motivations of participating companies, a material
consequence of the dominant horizontal framing of corporate non-financial (social and
environmental) responsibility is the dilution and displacement of social and political
pressures for stronger vertical forms of accountability. For critics this means CSR, and
corporate governance in general, lack social legitimacy. The notion of post-traditional
corporate governance offers a means of acknowledging business activity as embedded
in wider networks of governing with a range of public and private actors: the simple
recognition of this fact – including its unavoidable political role in shaping the social
and environmental performance (both positive and negative) of corporations – is the
first step in the necessary renewal of this social legitimacy.
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